The Oslo people-to-people program and the limits of hegemony by Naser-Najjab, N
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ccri20
Middle East Critique
ISSN: 1943-6149 (Print) 1943-6157 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccri20
The Oslo People-to-People Program and the Limits
of Hegemony
Nadia Naser-Najjab
To cite this article: Nadia Naser-Najjab (2019): The Oslo People-to-People Program and the
Limits of Hegemony, Middle East Critique, DOI: 10.1080/19436149.2019.1664797
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2019.1664797
Published online: 17 Sep 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
The Oslo People-to-People Program and
the Limits of Hegemony
NADIA NASER-NAJJAB
University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
ABSTRACT Reconciliation-based initiatives evoke a substantive and meaningful vision of peace
and suggest a form of peace building that is intimately engaged at the personal and social level.
This article critically engages with a specific reconciliation initiative, the People-to-People
Program (P2PP) that was applied to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It uses Gramscian concepts
of hegemony, consent, and war of position, with the intention of illustrating that the program
functioned as a disciplinary or regulatory device that structured and realigned the agency of its
Palestinian participants. In highlighting the different features and dimensions of Palestinian
subversion and resistance, it brings out the limits of hegemony.
KEY WORDS: Civil society; Diplomacy; Hegemony; Oslo Accords; Peace-building; People-to-
People program (P2PP); Settler colonialism
The People-to-People program is a form of second-track diplomacy that was put in
place by the 1995 Oslo II Agreement.1 Its implementation contributed to the fragmen-
tation of the Occupied Palestinian territories (OPT) and the events of 2007, when
HAMAS launched a coup in response to the Palestinian Authority (PA)’s failure to
recognize the results of the 2006 legislative elections. The Gaza-West Bank divide has
continued both to symbolize and reinforce Palestinian schisms.2
The Oslo Agreement also created enclaves3 that restricted Palestinian movement.4
After 1993, when the Agreement came into effect, construction of Israeli settlements
Correspondence Address: Nadia Naser-Najjab, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter,
Stocker Road, Exeter EX4 4ND, UK. Email: n.naser-najjab@exeter.ac.uk
1 Oslo II addressed issues of self-rule, established the Palestinian Authority (PA) and divided the West
Bank into three areas (Area A, which accounted for four percent of the West Bank, was allocated to the
PA; Area B, which was under joint Israeli and PA administration, accounted for 27 percent; and Area C,
which was under full Israeli control, accounted for 69 percent). The status of Jerusalem and other ‘final
status’ issues, were excluded from this agreement; see Raja Shehadeh (1997) From Occupation to Interim
Accords: Israeli and the Palestinian Territories, p. 71.
2 See, for example, As’ad Ghanem (2010) Palestinian Politics After Arafat: A Failed National Movement
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press); and Jamil Hilal (2010) The Polarization of the Palestinian
Political Field, Journal of Palestine Studies, 39(3), pp. 24–39.
3 Leila Farsakh (2005) Independence, Cantons or Bantustans: Whither the Palestinian State?, Middle East
Journal, 59(2), p. 238.
4 Sara Roy (1995) The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development, p. 117 (Washington, DC:
Institute for Palestinian Studies).
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increased by 53 percent.5 Israel’s creation of by-pass roads that connected these settle-
ments, enabling it to tighten its grip on Palestinian land and population brought about
further fragmentation.6 These activities were key contributing factors to the Al-Aqsa
Intifada, which broke out in September 2000.7 In response to this popular uprising,
Israel launched a full military operation against the PA and Palestinians. Roadblocks
were put in place, along with closures and other restrictions on Palestinian movement.8
In 2002, work began on the so-called ‘separation wall,’ which cuts through Palestinian
land, further reinforcing a general condition of fragmentation.9
Within this context Israel continues to expand its control and power. Far from
addressing this development, no agreements or initiatives10 have addressed crucial
issues related to Palestinian rights and sovereignty. On the contrary, arrangements such
as the 1994 Paris Protocols, under which Israel collects tax revenues on behalf of the
PA, actually reinforce Israeli control.11 Israel also exerts power through economic
development and the dependency that has emerged as a consequence of reliance on
aid.12As a consequence of Oslo II, international donors have assumed a prominent role
in peace-building and state-building interventions within the OPT.13 The professional-
ization of Palestinian society has been an important accompaniment to this develop-
ment, as Rema Hammami acknowledged: ‘… [M]any [formerly] popularly-based
grass-roots initiatives [became] professionally-based, foreign-funded development
centres which targeted clients as opposed to working with a constituency.’14 The P2PP
was in many respects an outgrowth of this development.15
Sceptical observers such as Adam Hanieh claim that such projects represent an
‘attempt to incorporate Israeli colonialism into the very practice of develop-
ment itself.’16
5 Peace Now (2000) Summary Data, 4 December 2000; and Palestinian Academic Society for the Study
of International Affairs (PASSIA) (2001) Settlements and the Final Status Talks, Special Bulletin,
March, Jerusalem/Al-Quds.
6 Eyal Weizman (2007) Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (London: Verso Books); and
Emile Badarin (2015) Settler-Colonialist Management of Entrances to the Native Urban Space in
Palestine, Settler Colonial Studies, 5(3), p. 5.
7 Marwan Bishara (2001) Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid: Prospects for Resolving the Conflict, p.
56 (Zed Books, London).
8 Saree Makdisi (2010) Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation (New York: Norton).
9 B’Tselem (2010) By Hook and By Crook: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank, Summary.
Jerusalem: 5 July; and World Bank (2011) Coping with Conflict: Poverty and Inclusion in the West
Bank and Gaza (Washington: The World Bank Group).
10 For example, the regional Arab Peace Initiative that Crown Prince Abdullah Bin Abdullaziz of Saudi
Arabia proposed in March 2002; later initiatives followed.
11 Adel Zagha & Husam Zumlot (2004) Israel and the Palestinian economy: Integration or Containment?,
in: Mushtaq Husain Khan, George Giacaman & Inge Amundsen (eds) State Formation in Palestine:
Viability and Governance During a Social Transformation (London: Routledge).
12 Rashid Khalidi (2006) The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood (Boston:
Beacon Press); and Toufic Haddad (2016) Palestine Ltd: Neoliberalism and Nationalism in the
Occupied Territories, p. 102 (London: I. B. Taurus)
13 Haddad, Palestine Ltd, p. 2.
14 Rema Hammami (1995) NGOs: The Professionalization of Politics, Race & Class, 37(2), p. 55.
15 Raja Khalidi & Samour Sobhi (2011) Neoliberalism as Liberation: The Statehood Program and the
Remaking of the Palestinian National Movement, Journal of Palestine Studies, 40(2), p. 15.
16 Adam Hanieh (2016) Development as Struggle: Confronting the Reality of Power in Palestine, Journal
of Palestine Studies, 45(4), p. 35; also see Taiaiake Alfred (2005) Wasase: Indigenous Path ways of
Actions and Freedom (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press), p. 35.
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In a context defined by deeply unequal power relations, ‘cooperation’ takes on a
very different meaning and implication. As Jan Selby notes (albeit with reference to
the distribution and usage of water resources): ‘Much of what had previously been
patron-client relations under occupation were suddenly discursively repackaged and
represented as instances of Israeli-Palestinian ‘co-operation.’17
In this article I offer a critical reading that does not engage with the question of
implementation. Instead, it draws on contributions from Antonio Gramsci, Michel
Foucault and the critical peace-building literature to illustrate how one should engage
with the P2PP and understand it as a ‘technology of government’ that subtly reformu-
lates and reorders. In considering this point, I also will bring out themes of Palestinian
resistance and subversion.
Methodology
My extensive experience as an organizer, coordinator and participant in P2PP activities
between 1995 and 2000 is incorporated into this article. In summer 2001, as part of
my doctoral dissertation research, I engaged with the P2PP through a series of open,
semi-structured and structured interviews with (Israeli and Palestinian) coordinators,
participants and officials. I conducted additional interviews and research project field-
work during 2003. In conducting the interviews, I had to overcome numerous
obstacles. The most obvious was the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which, in combination with the
Israeli army’s repressive measures, imposed considerable limitations on my freedom of
movement between the West Bank’s towns and villages and restricted my entry into
Israel and Jerusalem. While the vast majority of interviews were conducted face-to-
face, some were carried out via telephone.
My Palestinian nationality and my previous participation within the P2PP enabled
me to establish a rapport with interviewees and to form contacts (interviews with
Israelis were facilitated by an Israeli coordinator). It also made it easier for me to
access required information and data sources. Being a Palestinian researcher has helped
me to understand how the perspective of the dominant actor and the absence of an
analysis of power relations can skew ‘neutrality.’18 I therefore was able to ‘propos[e]
solutions to the real-life dilemmas that indigenous communities confront.’19 My status
as a Palestinian also has helped me to understand how research can be a form of
resistance directed towards the structures and tactics of colonization.20
The P2P Program
The P2PP brought a certain coherence to contact between Israelis and Palestinians, cre-
ating an institutionalization and sense of purpose that was previously absent. It was
not a stand-alone initiative, the intention being to feed into wider peace-building
17 Jan Selby (2003) Dressing up Domination as ‘Cooperation’: The Case of Israeli-Palestinian Water
Relations, Review of International Studies, 29 (1), p. 123.
18 Ismael Abu-Saad (2008) Where inquiry ends: The peer review process and indigenous standpoints,
American Behavioral Scientist, 51, p. 1914.
19 Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012) Decolonizing Methodologies (London: Zed Books), p. 151.
20 Sandy Grande (2004) Red Pedagogy: Native American Social and Political Thought, p. 30 (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers).
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enterprises.21 Article VIII (The People-to-People Program) of Annex VI (Protocol
Concerning Israeli- Palestinian Co-operation Program) of Oslo II, states:
1. The two sides shall cooperate in enhancing the dialogue and relations between
their peoples in accordance with the concepts developed in co-operation with the
Kingdom of Norway.
2. The two sides shall cooperate in enhancing dialogue relations between their
peoples, as well as in gaining a wider exposure of the two publics to the peace
process, its current situation and predicted results.
3. The two sides shall take steps to foster public debate and involvement, to remove
barriers to interaction, and to increase the people to people exchange and
interaction within all areas of cooperation… 22
The P2PP23 expressed a strong belief in the benefits of civil society engagement
and mobilization. It emphasized the importance of removing obstacles to contact
(Article VIII of Annex VI of Oslo II) and sought to establish a neutral and unthreaten-
ing space in which social actors—a privileged role was afforded to Private and
Voluntary Organisations (PVOs) and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs)—could
pursue their personal and social interests. It maintained that contact would dissolve
preconceptions and prejudices and establish a clear space within which mutual interests
could be identified and developed (here it should be noted that ‘contact’ was theorized
at a psychological or interpersonal level and little or no reference was made to the
wider ‘framing’ context—see below).
The P2PP’s structure was set out in Article III (Annex VI) of Oslo II. This estab-
lished a Standing Cooperation Committee (SCC) that brought together Israeli and
Palestinian representatives to co-ordinate activities and projects. Initially, it was funded
by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later was supported by a range of
institutional donors, including the European Union, USAID and the Canada Fund. The
Norwegian Foreign Ministry was represented on the P2PP’s steering committee (a
privilege denied to other donors) and was also accorded a pre-eminent political role.24
The Norwegian Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science Centre for International
Studies in Oslo (subsequently Fafo) was responsible for coordinating with Israeli par-
ticipants and Palestinian planning groups.
The political and popular components were established with the clear expectation
that they would be interdependent. However, this initial aspiration was frustrated from
the outset by Palestinian officials, who objected that it lacked a supporting consensus.
21 Dimitris Bouris (2010) The European Union’s Role in the Palestinian Territory after the Oslo Accords:
Stillborn State-building, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 6 (3), pp. 376–394. Available
at: http://www.jcer.net/ojs/index.php/jcer/article/view/205/232, accessed February 2, 2019; Khalidi &
Sobhi, ‘Neoliberalism as Liberation;’ and Haddad, Palestine Ltd.
22 Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) (1996) Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (1995), p. 227 (Washington DC: Occasional Document Series, No.
7, August).
23 This article clearly distinguishes between the P2P program (established by the Oslo II Agreement) and
the voluntary joint activities prior to the Oslo II Agreement.
24 Lena Endresen & Signe Gilen (2000) Consultation and Consensus: Implementing the Israeli-Palestinian
People-to-People Program for Development, Development: Journal of the Society for International
Development, 43(3), pp. 29–33; and Lena Endresen (2001) Contact and Cooperation: The Israeli-
Palestinian People-to-People Program (Oslo: Institute for Applied Social Science).
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Hassan Abu-Libedeh,25 who developed the concept of the P2PP during the Oslo nego-
tiations, further clarified the Palestinian opposition; he noted:
[T]he Palestinian reading of the Oslo Agreement is absent while the Israeli one
has remained dominant. P2P for Palestinians is supposed to be a strategic goal
and a real investment in raising Israeli public opinion on the Palestinian political
position and perceptions of the Oslo Agreement.26
Other key Palestinian institutions also rejected the P2PP, on the basis that the pre-
vailing occupation made it impossible for Israelis and Palestinians to engage on equal
terms. This was the position of both Birzeit University and the Palestinian Ministry
of Education.
In addition to being substantially weakened by the conscious disengagement of pol-
itical and civil society actors (although it should be recognized that individuals did
sometimes otherwise engage), the conceptual and theoretical foundations of the P2PP
also were strikingly disconnected from the local context. This was most clearly evident
in the fact that it failed to acknowledge, much less engage with, a pre-existent tradition
of contact.27 During the First Intifada, Israelis and Palestinian activists had united in
opposition to the occupation, with Israeli peace activists often being subjected to the
same brutal treatment as their Palestinian counterparts.28
The limitations of the P2PP were not entirely internal (e.g., related to the internal
arrangement and structure of the P2PP) but also derived from an external environ-
ment that had been created, in large part, by the Oslo Agreement. This environment
often became a topic of discussion during P2PP activities. However, the P2PP had a
limited ability to engage with this wider reality precisely because it was based on the
assumption—shared by Israeli participants— that cooperation would be strengthened
through the establishment of personal relationships and professional cooperation.
Despite its questionable relationship to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, prominent
donors and international actors continued to evidence an abiding faith in the potential
of the P2PP.29
The EU alone, as the largest international donor currently engaged with the con-
flict,30 contributed an annual total of between e5–10 million to P2P-related activities
25 Author Interview, Hassan Abu-Libedeh, Ramallah, October 19, 2003. Hassan Abu-Libedeh worked for
the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics when I interviewed him. In 2019 he was the Minister/Chief
of Staff in the Prime Minister’s Office.
26 Ibid.
27 Reuven Kaminer (1996) Politics of Protest: The Israeli Peace Movement and the Palestinian Intifada
(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press); Mazin Qumsiyeh (2012) Popular Resistance in Palestine: A
History of Hope and Empowerment (London: Pluto Press); and Marwan Darweish & Andrew Rigby
(2015) Popular Protest in Palestine: The Uncertain Future of Unarmed Resistance (London:
Pluto Press).
28 Mordechai Bar-On (1996) In Pursuit of Peace: A History of the Israeli Peace Movement (Washington,
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press), p. 227.
29 Naseef Mu’allem (1999) Palestinian Israeli Civil Society Co-operative Activities,paper presented at
Peace Building between Israelis and Palestinians workshop, Helsinki, November 27–28; Paul Scham
(2000) Arab-Israeli research cooperation, 1995–1999, Middle East Review of International Affairs
Journal, 4(3), pp. 1–16; Sari Hanafi (2007) Dancing Tango During Peace-building: Palestinian-Israeli
People-to-People Programs for Conflict Resolution, in: Judy Kuriansky, Beyond Bullets & Bombs; and
Grassroots Peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians, pp. 69–80 (Westport, CT: Praeger).
30 Bouris, The European Union’s Role.
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(exemplified by the EU’s Partnership for Peace Program (PFP)31 and Peace-building
Initiative). In the years subsequent to 2008, the US government contributed an annual
total of around $10 million to P2P activities,32 with USAID’s Conflict Management
and Mitigation Program being a case-in-point. This support has been accompanied by
a sustained reluctance to engage with the root causes of the conflict or its colonial
dimensions. In 2008, to take one example, the EU yielded to pro-Israeli pressure and
withdrew funding for the Israeli Committee against House Demolition (ICAHD).33
Theoretical Framework
The P2PP was deeply indebted to classical contact theory and the work of social psychol-
ogists such as Gordon Allport (1954),34 Stuart Cook (1962),35 Yehuda Amir (1969)36
and Thomas Pettigrew (1971).37 It also incorporated later innovations in the field, such
as Social Identity Theory (SIT), which had been developed by Henri Tajfel (1974)38 and
John Turner (1979),39 largely in response to the limitations of the contact hypothesis. SIT
attempts to gain insight into the role of self and social identity in inter-group interaction
and behavior by analyzing variables that explain individual and/or collective interaction.
These theories explain how contact changes negative attitudes and stereotypes and
demonstrate how attitudinal change can promote peaceful social relations. In engaging
with individual perceptions, they emphasize how improved mutual understanding can
challenge and overcome prejudice.40 However, these theories quite clearly grasp that
knowledge about the other is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for positive
contact. This was recognized from an early stage: Allport’s contact hypothesis theory,
31 The EU Partnership for Peace Program’s 2015 Guidelines set out a clear set of aims, which establish
that P2P initiatives should: (1) Promote civil society peace-building and conflict transformation actions
through initiatives that are likely to impact on people’s everyday lives and attitudes: (2) Support
practical actions aiming at building mutual trust through reconciliation, thereby building capacity for
non-violent approaches to conflict resolution, promoting tolerance, combatting incitement to violence,
empowering marginalised parties and launching joint development actions and strategies; (3) Strengthen
direct civil society relationships, further enhance forms of co-operation grounded within equality and
reciprocity and bring Palestinians and Israelis together. Available at: https://cdn5-eeas.fpfis.tech.ec.
europa.eu/cdn/farfuture/D5Q-duWanuhAaN7GgLlCWQO4N6V9zTybx1_sdi4Git8/mtime:1476870254/
sites/eeas/files/eupi-eupfp-programme-at-a-glance-2016_en.pdf, accessed November 22, 2018.
32 Alliance for Middle East Peace. US Annual People-to-People Funding. Available online at: http://www.
allmep.org/u-s-annual-people-to-people-funding/, accessed July 23, 2018.
33 NGO Monitor (2016) Israeli Committee against House Demolitions (ICAHD). Available at: http://
www.ngo-monitor.org/ngos/israel_committee_against_house_demolitions_icahd_/, accessed September
10, 2017.
34 Gordon Allport (1954) The Nature of Prejudice (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley).
35 Stuart Cook (1962) The Systematic Analysis of Socially Significant Events: A Strategy of Social
Research, Journal of Social Issues, 18, pp. 66–84.
36 Yehuda Amir (1969) The Contact Hypothesis in Ethnic Relations, Psychological Bulletin, 71 (5),
pp. 319–342.
37 Thomas Pettigrew (1971) Racially Separate or Together?(New York: McGraw-Hill)
38 Henri Tajfel (1974) Social Identity and Intergroup Behavior, Social Science Information, 13, pp. 65–93.
39 H. Tajfel & John Turner (1979) An integrative theory of intergroup conflict, in: William G. Austin &
Stephen Worchel (eds) Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, pp. 33–37 (Monterey, CA:
Brook/Cole).
40 Allport, The Nature of Prejudice; Thomas Pettigrew, Racially Separate or Together?; Walter G.
Stephan & Cookie White Stephan (1984) The role of ignorance in intergroup relations, in Norman
Miller & Marilynn Brewer (eds) Groups in Contact: The Psychology of Desegregation, pp. 281–302
(Orlando FL: Academic).
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to take an important example, emphasized that effective contact only could occur if
certain situational conditions were met (e.g., equality of status, intimate relations, com-
mon goals and institutional support).41
Criticism of the P2PP tended to focus on the conditions of contact and the
assessment criteria.42 This is reflected in the fact that many contributors are
predisposed to engage within a ‘problem-solving’ framework.43 Other, more
critically orientated observers, instead highlight, to take one example, the gap that
divides the donor agenda and NGO priorities.44 Palestinian participants highlighted
divergences between the two groupings.45 Palestinian participants also frequently
cited the wider political conditions (power imbalances, restrictions on movement,
closures and the fragmentation of Palestinian territory) as ongoing concerns.46
These opinions raise the question of how the P2PP theoretically ought to be
engaged. First, it is essential to begin with the observation that the P2PP initiated
‘subtle’ forms of power, which operated through and within the agency of its partici-
pants. To borrow Gramsci’s formulation, it originated forms of power that were ‘half
man, half beast.’47 Gramsci also provides insight into the limits of hegemony. In
applying Gramsci to the P2PP, I will explore and develop hegemony, consent and war
of position,48 thereby providing insight into themes of agency and resistance.
Gramsci’s analysis of civil society also has a direct relevance for P2PP. His multi-
dimensional account of power has several potential applications. He is concerned with
‘the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not
only justifies and maintains its dominance, but [also] manages to win the active consent
of those over whom it rules.’49 Gramsci’s analysis of hegemony makes it possible to take
the concept apart and situate it in a wider context. This is particularly important as it
resists the temptation to concentrate power, or to equate it with particular forms, and
does not equate ‘power’ with the ability to coerce. It is important to note that the P2PP
41 Allport, The Nature of Prejudice.
42 The Palestine-Israel Journal previously engaged a number of these issues in its 2000 and 2005/06
issues. See ‘Reflections on Joint Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Projects’, Palestine-Israel Journal of
Politics, Economics and Culture, 7(1–2) (2000) and People-to-People: What Went Wrong and How to
Fix It?, Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture, 12–13(4) (2005–06).
43 Lena Endresen (2001) Contact and Cooperation: The Israeli-Palestinian People-to-People Program
(Oslo: Institute for Applied Social Science), p. 22
44 Mohammed Shadid & Caroline Qutteneh (2000) Palestinian Governmental NGO Relations: Cooperation
and Partnership: Proceedings of the International Conference, February 16, 2000 (Ramallah: Welfare
Association Consortium); and Dan Bar-On and Sami Adwan (2000) PRIME’s Role in Supporting the
Collaboration of Palestinian and Israeli NGOs, in: Sami Adwan and Dan Bar-OnBeit (eds) The Role of
Non-Governmental Organizations in Peace-Building Between Palestinians and Israelis, pp. 68–72 (Beit
Jala: PRIME Publications)
45 Ibid.
46 Ifat Maoz (2000) Issues in Grassroot Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation: A Report on the NGO Discussion
Panels, in ibid, pp. 63–67.
47 Robert W. Cox (1996) Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method, in: R.
Cox (ed.) Approaches to World Order, pp. 124–143 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
48 Quintin Hoare & Jeffrey Nowell-Smith (eds) (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio
Gramsci, p. 495 (New York: International Publishers); & R. Cox (1983) Gramsci, Hegemony and
International Relations: An Essay in Method, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 12(2),
p. 165.
49 Ibid, p. 244.
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did not cancel or deny the agency of local actors; rather, Palestinian participation was the
means through which power was enabled and reproduced.
Similarly, Michel Foucault analyzed forms of power that operate through and within
freedom and autonomy. Foucault viewed freedom as an essential accompaniment of
power rather than its point of denial. As Gramsci emphasized, the education system
plays a crucial role in this respect. A 2015 study by Nadia Naser-Najjab and Ilan
Pappe examining how international donors had engaged with allegations of incitement
within Palestinian school textbooks, brought out this point in more detail. The authors
observed that the framework of engagement delegitimized Palestinian narratives of
resistance and struggle and lent a spurious legitimacy to practices of occupation.50
In common with Foucault, Gramsci also made use of the concept of the ‘social,’
with the intention of underlining how hegemony extends to ‘everyday’ social interac-
tions.51 Gramsci breaks with the assumption that the formal political sphere and power
are synonymous and, in so doing, shatters the misconception that civil society is apol-
itical, that it exists in serene detachment from venal and debased political passions.
Any strategy of resistance, by implication, would need to begin with the insight that
the beliefs, principles and values of the ruling class are dispersed throughout society.
By implication, any strategy that began with the misconception that power is concen-
trated ultimately would come up against its own conceptual and practical limitations.
Consequently, internationally sponsored civil society initiatives situate Palestinian
society as both the object (to be transformed) and the subject (the means through which
transformation is to be enabled and perpetuated) of reform. Far from being contradictory,
this ostensible paradox is intrinsic to what Foucault termed ‘liberal technologies of gov-
ernment,’ that is, practices and techniques that insert and apply control through the
modality of freedom. This is achieved through partnership based on claimed equality and
even-handedness. The P2PP adopts the discourse of peace and reconciliation while ignor-
ing the colonial reality. This is an example of how ‘participation’ and ‘equality’ come to
function as means through which colonial relations are reproduced. Palestinians thereby
become ‘partners’ in the reproduction of external knowledge and practices.52
According to Foucault ‘“Government” did not refer only to political structures or to
the management of states; rather, it designated the way in which the conduct of indi-
viduals or of groups might be directed… To govern, in this sense, is to structure the
possible field of action of others.’53 This outline also can be applied to Selby’s discus-
sion of water usage and distribution. He states: ‘[F]ormalisation of Israeli-Palestinian
cooperation had enabled Israel to divest itself of some of the most onerous burdens of
occupation, without losing control of either water resources or supplies to Israeli settle-
ments, and without having to forego its discriminatory pricing policy.’54
As with any system of power, it is essential not to take our object of analysis at its
own level of justification—that is, as complete or enveloping. Rather, it is essential to
50 Nadia Naser-Najjab & Ilan Pappe (2015) Reframing Palestine in the Post-Oslo period, in: Robert
Guyver (ed.) Teaching History and the Changing Nation States: Transnational and International
Perspectives, pp. 9–29 (London: Bloomsbury Academic Publications).
51 Gramsci, Prison notebooks, p. 244.
52 Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015) Security Theology: Surveillance and the Politics of Fear
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 6.
53 Michel Foucault (1982) The Subject and Power, Critical Inquiry, 8(4), p. 790.
54 Jan Selby (2003) Dressing up Domination as ‘Cooperation’: The Case of Israeli-Palestinian Water
Relations, Review of International Studies, 29 (1), p. 31.
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remain alert to points of potential subversion and negotiation. That is, we should resist
the temptation to fetishize power, as this article acknowledges by reasserting that the
strategies or tactics of subaltern resistance are just as worthy of attention (and in the
Palestinian context, this implies a closer engagement with ‘hidden transcripts’ and
‘hidden’ or ‘symbolic resistances.’55)
In one example of ‘veiled resistance,’ Palestinian participants made clear that they only
had engaged with the P2PP in order to pursue personal benefit and national interest. A par-
ticipant in a project I helped to coordinate said: ‘I am bored because I’m not allowed to
travel. I love to go to the sea, so this project gave me the opportunity to visit entertaining
places like Tel Aviv.’56 Other Palestinians said that they had no intention of recognizing,
much less working with, the P2PP objectives. According to one participant, ‘Israelis tried
to contact me for social and personal meetings. I did not meet with them on that basis.
That was not my objective.’57 A similar disregard also was shown toward legal require-
ments: during one Jerusalem event, participants refused to obtain the required permit for a
Jerusalem meeting because they considered it part of the West Bank and the Palestinian
state; instead, they sought to access the city through a series of side roads.
This attitude reflected the fact that travel arrangements and negotiation of the permit
system were an important part of the asymmetry.58 Palestinian participation was to this
extent conditional on ‘good conduct.’ Lee Perlman, an Israeli coordinator, acknowledged:
I believe that the issue of permits was very dehumanising for the Palestinians,
and it certainly had a terrible impact on the dignity of the Palestinians. A
Palestinian who had spent from two to six hours to obtain the permit would come
very angry to the meeting. Thus, [the] first activity was always connected to what
happened with the permits.59
Perlman added:
Before arriving at Ramallah, I made sure to call the Israeli army and inform them
that we would be there and give them a list of the names and identity numbers of
all the participants. This was for two reasons: One psychological and one
organisational as part of our responsibility and policy.60
The P2PP’s detachment from reality and its inability to take power relations into
consideration resulted in Palestinian objections and criticisms.61 As a Palestinian par-
ticipant observed:
55 James C.Scott (1990) Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (London: Yale
University Press e-book). Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1np6zz, accessed February 26,
2017; and Markus Bouillon (2004) Gramsci, Political Economy, and the Decline of the Peace Process,
Critique: Critical Journal of Middle East Studies, 13(3), pp. 239–264.
56 Author Interview, Ramallah, August 18, 2001.
57 Author Interview, Ramallah, September 7, 2001.
58 Ifat Maoz (2004) Peace Building in Violent Conflict: Israeli-Palestinian Post-Oslo People-to-People
Activities, International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 17(3), pp. 563–565.
59 Author Interview, Lee Perlman, Londonderry, Northern Ireland, June 29, 2001.
60 Ibid.
61 Nadim Rouhana (2004) Group Identity and Power Asymmetry in Reconciliation Processes: The Israeli-
Palestinian case, Peace and Conflict, pp. 41–22.
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One time, we were in one of the villages [as part of the P2PP], and they were
distributing a publication on how to use water and economize in use of water, and
one woman asked me a question: I cannot imagine how an Israeli is coming here to
educate me on how to use water while I still use the bucket and close to me there is
a settlement where they have swimming pools, so how an Israeli comes to educate
me on how to use water and they are occupying our land? The Israeli institution
working with you should work inside the Israeli society and not educate me.62
Critical contributions to the peace-building literature also have a clear relevance to
the P2PP. Much of the preceding analysis is concisely summarized by Oliver
Richmond, who saw a clear danger ‘that top-level actors will instil in the system their
own biases and interests, while arguing that they are constructing a universal system.
Any universal peace system is therefore open to being hijacked by hegemonic
actors.’63 Richmond’s allusion to ‘biases and interests’ implicitly invokes the hege-
monic system of neo-liberal capitalism.64 This again demonstrates how a disciplinary
or regulatory set of techniques can become equated with an emancipatory project that
aspires to social transformation and the concrete realization of various freedoms. As
Richmond illustrates, this conflation has been profoundly negative, resulting in innu-
merable discursive and conceptual enclosures and the origination of a ‘form [of peace]
that is so ontologically solid that no debate is required.’65 Richmond’s reading of neo-
liberal peace building presents an emaciated and insubstantial form that has been com-
prehensively divested of its emancipatory or transformative potential.
Richmond’s critique is clearly relevant to the Palestinian case. Here peace-building
has given way to state-building, a project closely aligned with elite interests and wider
systemic preferences.66 As Richmond repeatedly has iterated, the proposition that the
sterile axioms of ‘good governance’ can sustain peace is a classically liberal conceit.
This shift also singly fails to acknowledge that peace is, in the Palestinian context,
essentially a precondition. The protracted failure of the peace process therefore origi-
nates in a prior conceptual limitation rather than a practical application. Raja Khalidi
and Samour Sobhi make this point: ‘The statehood program encourages the idea that
citizens may have to acquiesce in occupation but will not be denied the benefits of
smoother running traffic, a liberal education curriculum, investor-friendly institutions
[and] efficient public service delivery.’67 The displacement of peace-building by state-
building provides one illustration of how external donors seek to reframe the terms of
engagement, while subtly orientating the respective actors toward their own interests,
preferences and political discourse.68
62 Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) (2006) Palestinian-Israeli Public Debate on
People-to-People Program: An Evaluation, p. 21 (Jerusalem: JMCC).
63 Oliver P. Richmond (2007) Critical Research Agendas for Peace: The Missing Link in the Study of
International Relations, Alternatives, 32(2), p. 258.
64 Ibid, p. 261.
65 Ibid, p. 250.
66 Haddad, Palestine Ltd, p.138.
67 Raja Khalidi & Samour Sobhi (2011) Neoliberalism as Liberation: The Statehood Programme and the
Remaking of the Palestinian National Movement, Journal of Palestine Studies, 40(2), p. 15; and Bouris
(2010) The European Union’s Role in the Palestinian Territory after the Oslo Accords: Stillborn State-
building, p. 380.
68 Haddad, Palestine Ltd; and Shir Hever (2017) The Political Economy of Israel’s Occupation:
Repression beyond Exploitation (London: Pluto Press).
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The vernacular of ‘capacity-building’, so beloved by international practitioners, cre-
ates the clear impression that the end aspiration is a political institution that is able to
operate independently of external influence. However, this conceals the essential point
that the ‘weakness’ of the Palestinian Authority has a clear functional benefit: The
PA’s deeply ingrained weakness and dependency69 is not just an inadvertent after-
effect, but instead an intended design component, conceived as a means through which
external forms of ‘discipline’ could be more completely embodied and realized. This
article adapts this insight to suggest that both the general framework (Oslo Accords)
and specific mechanism (the P2PP) can be interpreted as instruments that subtly dis-
cipline and regulate the domestic context, while aligning it with external preferences.70
Hegemony and Consent
It is essential to acknowledge that the participants did not engage under conditions or
terms of their own choosing. While ‘participation’ was openly solicited and celebrated
by the P2PP, closer inspection revealed that participation only could occur within cer-
tain limitations and constraints. This is clearly indicated by the depoliticized character
of the P2PP. It was not an accidental or inadvertent feature, but was quite clearly
anticipated in the P2PP design and intention.
Planning groups zealously monitored project content, taking care to ensure that pol-
itical content was not allowed to creep in (although this was part of the P2PP design,
Palestinian political representatives also had a clear vested interest in ensuring that
their own interests remained immune from political challenge or contestation).71 From
the outset, this created a clear contradiction, or tension, as many Palestinians engaged
with the P2PP with explicitly political ends and purposes in mind: A large majority
saw the P2PP as a means through which Israelis could be ‘educated’ and ‘enlightened’
about the realities of occupation.
Gramsci also makes an invaluable contribution by highlighting that consent and con-
trol are not diametric opposites; rather, the former is, in many respects and instances, a
precondition for the latter. Upon engaging with the P2PP, the respective participants
consented to a framework of engagement that sought to structure and reorder their
own agency—it quite explicitly sought to challenge, alter and reconfigure the terms
upon which they engaged with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This consent was not
self-sustaining, but instead was prefigured by a system of enticements. As Gramsci
observed, consent to hegemony is related to its associated benefits or rewards.
Therefore, and although criticism of the P2PP was pronounced from the outset, no
decisive steps were taken.
As early as June 1995, participants had begun to voice concerns on these and other
issues. In my role as a coordinator for Al-Jiser, a Palestinian NGO, I arranged an
internal meeting which brought together 35 Palestinian participants in total (including
directors and staff members from 20 different NGOs). During the meeting, a number
of speakers voiced concern that the lack of a Palestinian strategy was contributing to a
69 Khalidi, The Iron Cage, pp. 172–181.
70 Robert W. Cox (1996) Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method, in: R.
Cox (ed.) Approaches to World Order, pp. 124–143 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 138;
and Haddad, Palestine Ltd.
71 Endresen & Gilen, Consultation and Consensus.
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situation in which Israeli NGOs worked around their ‘partners’ (often by engaging
with individuals in a personal capacity), enabling them to impose their own agenda
upon ‘joint’ projects.
The meeting succeeded in outlining a clear agenda. In addition to clarifying that dia-
logue should be a means to an end (rather than an end in and of itself), it also estab-
lished the need for a unified Palestinian strategy; improved training and capacity-
building; enhanced institutional oversight of the P2PP; clarification of the legal status
of Palestinian NGOs; development of a unified funding agency policy; and a ‘reaching
out’ to wider Israeli and Palestinian public opinion.72
Their efforts in this respect did not, however, elicit the anticipated response. One
Israeli participant complained: ‘Palestinians are so busy showing us their misery and
expecting us to be one-sided, on their side.’ Another Israeli participant criticized the
Palestinian tendency to present their cause while refusing to take responsibility for
their situation. Israelis, for their part, viewed the P2PP as an opportunity to break with
the past and open a new chapter in Israeli-Palestinian relations. This was embodied in
one Israeli assertion that the ‘past does not help with the future.’ For Palestinians,
however, the past overshadows the present. As one participant said:
In one case a Palestinian brought along a manual coffee grinder as an example of
Palestinian culture. One Israeli participant commented that he had not seen this
mill before. The Palestinian answered that he (the Israeli) must have seen it
abandoned in one of the houses taken over by Israelis in 1948.73
Given that their motivations so transparently diverged from the outset, it was per-
haps unsurprising that several meetings broke up in acrimonious circumstances.
According to Abu Saad, ‘the dominant group tended to know only its own understand-
ing of reality and social relations because it had ignored, rejected, and silenced the dif-
fering perspectives of those over whom it had power.’74 It was also noticeable that the
‘peace’ discourse was deployed in a manner that silenced Palestinian narratives.
Foucault previously had described the institutional control and deployment of dis-
course.75 The example of the P2PP shows how the Israeli state succeeded in co-opting
and instrumentalizing the peace discourse.This proved to be particularly frustrating for
Palestinian participants, as their interpretations of peace were marginalized by ‘rules of
exclusion.’76 But Foucault made clear that this discourse could be contested: ‘discourse
is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is
to be seized.’77 It was perhaps unproductive to expect donors to resolve these issues,
as to some extent they were actually the problem. For example, I repeatedly encoun-
tered the objection that donors viewed Palestinians as inferior and lacking in the capa-
bilities (administrative, logistical, etc.) that would enable them to contribute to
the P2PP.
72 Al-Jiser (1995) Palestinian Meeting for People Concerned with Joint Activities with Israelis.
Unpublished paper (Jerusalem: Al-Jiser).
73 Author Interview, Ali Haseeb, Ramallah, January 29, 2004.
74 Abu Saad, ‘Where Enquiry Ends,’ p. 1906.
75 M. Foucault (1984) The Order of Discourse, in: M. Shapiro (ed.) Language and Politics, I. McLeod
(trans.), p. 110.
76 Ibid, pp. 108–138.
77 Ibid, p. 110.
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Whenever these complaints were voiced, I always thought of Edward Said’s
Orientalism, and the accumulated cultural, political and historical baggage that predis-
poses many Americans and Europeans to view Arabs as ‘child-like’ and culturally
inferior. While it would be easy to exaggerate these concerns, it was clear that
Orientalist attitudes had not disappeared. Given that the P2PP was predicated on the
equality of all participants, it was more than a little surprising that some international
donors saw no issue with Israeli NGOs assuming a mentoring role or assuming sole
responsibility for financial management (on the grounds that their Palestinian counter-
parts might ‘misuse’ funding).
Philip Veerman, the director of Defence for Children International-Israel (DCI-
Israel) provided a particularly insightful example: His NGO, in partnership with the
Palestinian Counselling Center (PCC), had submitted an application to a prominent
American donor agency. After the application successfully went through successive
assessment phases, DCI-Israel received a letter that suggested that it would be appro-
priate for it to assume responsibility for financial oversight and reporting. Veerman
was uncomfortable with the proposed arrangement, and was fully aware that poten-
tially it could complicate relations with the PCC. Separate conversations with other
NGOs persuaded me that this was not an isolated incident, but was instead indicative
of a deeply rooted mindset.78
This point was brought home with renewed force during an interview with Sarah
Ozacky-Lazar, the director of Givat Haviva/the Jewish-Arab Center for Peace.79 I was
astonished to learn that even activities and courses focused on the empowerment of
Palestinian society sometimes were run and administered by Israeli NGOs. In discus-
sing the EU’s funding arrangements, Ozacky-Lazar also acknowledged the pervasive
concern that Palestinian NGOs might reassign or otherwise misuse allocated funds.
This asymmetry was not an unfortunate or contingent feature but was instead
entrenched within the very fabric of the peace process.
It is clear that a considerable portion of blame also can be apportioned to
Palestinian NGOs, which consistently evidenced an inability to outline and adhere to a
collective stance. At this juncture, Palestinians still calculated that consent would elicit
the anticipated benefits. A specific example helps to reiterate this point. In 1999, three
participating NGOs (the Finnish Citizens’ Security Council [KATU], the Palestinian
Centre for Peace [PCP] and the Economic Co-operation Foundation) arranged an
evaluative Workshop on the Israeli-Palestinian Civil Society-Cooperative Activities,
which brought together donor representatives and Palestinian, Israeli and European
NGOs. During the course of the workshop, familiar concerns were raised and dis-
cussed. However, the final letter of recommendation did not reflect the content of
these discussions, and instead called for continued funding.80 Even taking into account
the possibility that Palestinian contributors were seeking to subvert the established
agenda in more subtle or covert ways, it seems unusual that this opportunity was
passed over in favor of a bland reiteration of the P2PP’s core aims: ‘We emphasize
78 See further Sami Adwan & Philip Veerman (2000) Reflections on Joint Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation
Projects, Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture, 7(1–2), pp. 89–96.
79 Author Interview, Sarah Ozacky-Lazar, Jerusalem, August 28, 2001.
80 KATU-Helsinki (1999) Declaration of Recommendation to Donors Supporting the Israeli-Palestinian
Civil Society-Cooperative Activities: Report of the Workshop on the Israeli-Palestinian Civil Society
Cooperative Activities, November 27–28 (Helsinki: KATU-Helsinki).
Oslo People-to-People Program 13
the need to enable the expansion of the people-to-people activities to reach a critical
mass of Israelis and Palestinian citizens, particularly those who are not fully supportive
of the peace process and those who are moderately opposed to it.’81
The P2PP after the Second Intifada: The Limits of Hegemony
While concerns and grievances continued to accumulate during the P2PP, it should be
acknowledged that, from the outset. Palestinians had been far from enthusiastic about
engaging with the P2PP. Issa Rabadi of IPCRI, a co-director of a peace education pro-
ject, explained: ‘I feel I have to explain myself and state that I do not work on normal-
isation. I tell people that I want to serve my cause and raise the awareness of the
Palestinian identity through a peace education program. People are usually sarcastic
about the work with Israelis.’82
This attitude embodies the Palestinian concern that participation in the P2PP would
be conflated with normalization. Israelis who participated in the P2PP often made pre-
cisely this conflation, and assumed that, as a peace process was in operation,
Palestinians and Israelis could now engage on ‘normal’ terms.83 This was not the case,
and Palestinians gradually became resistant to joint projects that did not have, as their
stated goal, ‘resistance to and exposure of the Israeli occupation and all forms of dis-
crimination and oppression against the Palestinian people.’
By 2000 grievances had accumulated to the point where payment was a necessary
condition of continued Palestinian engagement. These financial benefits often proved
to be sufficient to overcome deeply rooted objections. This perhaps helps to explain
why there was no Palestinian consensus on a total boycott prior to the outbreak of the
Second Intifada in 2000. The militarization of the Intifada and grossly unequal power
relations ultimately convinced Palestinian civil society that a more decisive way of
resistance was an appropriate response. While various evaluations were undertaken,
Palestinian dissatisfaction with the P2PP continued to accumulate, peaking just prior to
the outbreak of the Second Intifada. After the uprising erupted in September 2000, the
General Assembly of the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO) responded by setting out
its position in a press release, which called on Palestinian and Arab NGOs to conclude
all joint projects (particularly P2P projects), and asserted that any future cooperation
should be made conditional upon the recognition of full Palestinian rights including
the right of return.84 This brings to mind Gramsci’s ‘war of position,’85 which Cox
defines as ‘the creation of “alternative institutions and alternative intellectual resources
within existing society.”’86
81 Ibid, p.1.
82 Author interview, Issa Rabadi, Jerusalem, December 15, 2003.
83 Manuel Hassassian (2000) The Role of Palestinian NGOs in Peace Building and Conflict Resolution,
in: Sami Adwan and Dan Bar-On (eds) The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Peace-
Building Between Palestinians and Israelis, p. 29 (Beit Jala: PRIME Publications)
84 The PNGO, however, made clear that it was willing to engage with Israeli organizations that
recognized these national rights. It stated: ‘These decisions do not conflict with the principle of
cooperation with any activity held by the Israeli Human Rights Associations to support the Palestinian
nation in its struggle for liberation and the establishment of a Palestinian state, and to declare their
support for a fair and durable peace.’ (PNGO, 2000: www.pngo.net), accessed February 24, 2004
85 Gramsci, Prison notebooks, p. 495.
86 Cox, Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations, p. 165.
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Some Israeli NGOs sought to address and engage Palestinian grievances. Bat
Shalom, an Israeli feminist NGO, submitted a message for the Palestinian people to
Al-Quds, which the newspaper published on March 25, 2001. This message reiterated
the Israeli government’s responsibility to resolve the Palestinian refugee issue, antici-
pated the dismantling of ‘the apparatus of occupation’ and sought an ongoing solidar-
ity between voices of ‘peace, coexistence and cooperation in the Middle East.’87
After a 2004 ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) declared the wall to
be illegal, Palestinian civil society began to mobilize under the banner of the Boycott,
Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, which gained particular impetus. This
development is not surprising, as it is quite transparent that BDS addresses the root
cause of the conflict (the colonization and the denial of Palestinian rights). Proceeding
in accordance with Gramsci’s ‘war of position,’ BDS sought a ‘decisive’ victory.
Some civil society organizations then sought to dissociate themselves fully from joint
initiatives. In 2005, for example, the Palestinian health sector published ‘An Open
Letter to the Palestinian and International Community Regarding Palestinian-Israeli
Cooperation in Health,’ which set out a number of clear objections to joint projects.88
However, BDS did not reject contact that sought to change political reality by forc-
ing the collapse of the colonial structure.89 The First Intifada, when Palestinians and
Israelis jointly participated in action-based, non-violent resistance, is an important his-
torical example in this respect. Joint protests against the wall at Bil’in provide a more
recent contemporary example.90 Here the power relation explicitly is acknowledged
and targeted, and Palestinians are the ‘empowered’ subjects leading genuinely popular
resistance in opposition to colonialism.
In January 2004, the P2PP was halted following the election of a Likud government
led by Ariel Sharon, which decided to withdraw from the P2PP.91 In the absence of a
broad consensus on P2PP, donors nonetheless have continued to fund P2PP activities.
Ongoing evaluations also continue to seek improved implementation. However, as the
political situation continued to deteriorate, Palestinians adopted a stronger position on
P2PP, and this underlines the limits of hegemony. The benefits offered by donors
were, by that stage, insufficient to ensure continued Palestinian engagement.
Consequently, in April 2005, international donors arranged a joint conference with the
aim of evaluating previous P2P projects. In a clear nod to Palestinian concerns, the
conference agenda explicitly registered the importance of power relations and the
wider political context. Dominique Rosetti, a member of the Canadian Representative
Office to the PA, also acknowledged that Israeli NGOs were, in comparison to their
87 Bat Shalom (2004) A Public Letter to the Palestinian People. Available at: www.batshalom.org,
accessed March 12, 2004.
88 Palestinian Committee for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (BDS) (2005) An Open Letter
to the Palestinian and International Community Regarding Palestinian-Israeli Cooperation in Health.
Available at: http://www.monabaker.com/pMachine/more.php?id=2903_0_1_84_M5, accessed
September 10, 2017.
89 PACBI Statement (2011) Israel’s Exceptionalism: Normalizing the Abnormal, October 31. Available at:
https://bdsmovement.net/news/israel%E2%80%99s-exceptionalism-normalizing-abnormal, accessed
January 21, 2017.
90 Mazin B. Qumsiyeh (2016) A Critical and Historical Assessment of Boycott, Divestment, and
Sanctions (BDS) in Palestine, in: Alpaslan Ozerdem, Chuck Thiessen & Mufid Qassoum (eds) Conflict
Transformation and the Palestinians (Florence: Taylor and Francis).
91 Author Interview, Akram Attalla, Jerusalem, February 19, 2004.
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Palestinian counterparts, better funded and possessed clear technical and administrative
advantages.92
The conference concluded that a lack of consensus within both societies inhibited
attempts to broaden participation within the P2PP. It also observed that the wider polit-
ical context should be acknowledged at all stages of project design, implementation
and evaluation.
In July 2006, the Norwegian Representative Office to the PA helped to fund a pub-
lic debate, which addressed itself to evaluating P2P activities and developing suitable
participant guidelines. In attempting to work around Israeli closures, they also arranged
parallel workshops, which produced a clear consensus on several important issues.
Firstly, there was general acknowledgement that the P2PP had failed to engage suffi-
ciently and to penetrate either Israeli or Palestinian society. Secondly, Palestinian con-
tributors highlighted the gulf between Palestinian and donor priorities and complained
that donor interventions had advantaged Israeli NGOs; in their view, this further com-
pounded the advantages that Israeli NGOs already enjoyed.93 Palestinian contributors
were highly critical of the way that ‘contact’ had been framed in apolitical and proced-
ural terms. In their view, this significantly diminished the legitimacy of Palestinian
resistance and the central significance of Palestinian political rights.94
Conclusion
This article has sought to develop a critical analysis of the P2PP, with a view to link-
ing it to broader strategic interests and priorities by adapting and applying Gramsci’s
theoretical lens of ‘hegemony.’ Rather than focusing on the theoretical conditions for
effective contact, I instead situated the P2PP within the wider power relations that cir-
culated during the Oslo era.95 From the outset, the P2PP was undermined by broader
political developments, and consequently failed to live up to its initial expectations. Its
designers began with precisely the opposite expectation, namely that the P2PP would
create positive wider momentum by helping to construct a peace ‘from below.’
However, far from establishing a basis for reconciliation, the P2PP became a cause of
division, and many Palestinian participants became disillusioned and ultimately disen-
gaged from the process.
The Gramscian framework helps us to understand better how Palestinians sought to
resist the hegemony of the internationally-imposed agenda of neoliberal state building.
It also draws out features of Palestinian resistance, such as the BDS movement, which
has grown in stature and confidence. Within Israel, the administrators of occupation
have viewed it with trepidation and concern, even to the point of perceiving it as an
existential threat to Israel. However, I suggest that BDS ought to be viewed as an out-
growth of the general development of P2PP. In observing the P2PP through this lens, I
92 Dominique Rosetti (2005/06) Peace-building Programmes: A Canadian View. A new Canadian Project
for the Advancement of Peace, Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture, 12–13(4),
p. 64.
93 Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) (1996) Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (1995) (Washington DC: Occasional Document Series No.
7, August).
94 Ibid.
95 Bouillon, Gramsci, Political Economy and the Decline of the Peace Process, p. 242.
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came to view BDS as accentuating its limitations and progressing beyond them. In this
regard, BDS articulates the distinctive tenor and vernacular of Palestinian struggle.
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